Introduction
Terrorism law in Nigeria has developed through a mix of statute and strong appellate guidance. Below is a roundup of what the courts have emphasized about the nature of terrorism, its ingredients, ancillary “support” offences, and key procedural points that frequently arise.
What counts as “terrorism” and “international terrorism”?
The Supreme Court has clarified the cross-border character of international terrorism: “A fortiori, international terrorism primarily occurs outside the territorial jurisdiction, or transcends the national boundaries, of a country by the means it is carried out. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 11th edition (op cit) @1778.” — BERENDE v. FRN (2021) LPELR-54993(SC) Per Saulawa, JSC (Pp 73–74 Paras F–A).
On the nature of terrorism, the apex court distilled its coercive, fear-inducing essence: “The crucial aspect of the offence of terrorism is the creation of intense fear and anxiety, both physical and psychological in the minds of members of the public which has the effect of coercing, forcing, intimidating them to do or abstain from doing any act or to adopt or abandon a particular view, policy or position to act according to certain principles.”— ABDULMUMINI v. FRN (2017) LPELR-43726(SC) Per Kekere-Ekun, JSC (P. 29 Paras D–F)
Statutory anchors repeatedly cited by the courts
Several decisions discuss terrorism using statutory language that everyone should have at their fingertips:
Texts referenced in decided casesinclude the following formulations (as quoted in the judgments):
Section 15(2): “Any person who commits or attempts to commit a terrorist act or participates in it facilitates the commission of a terrorist act, commits an offence under this Act and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for life.” Section 46 (“Terrorism” means …): acts that endanger life or cause serious harm and are intended to (i) intimidate/coerce the public or government, (ii) disrupt essential services or create public emergency, or (iii) create general insurrection; plus promotion, sponsorship, contribution, command, aid, incitement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organization or procurement toward such acts. — ABDULMUMINI v. FRN (2017) LPELR-43726(SC) Per Kekere-Ekun, JSC (Pp 21–23); OKAH v. FRN (2021) LPELR-56655(CA) Per Adah, JCA (Pp 49–51)
“Support” to terrorism: the wide net of Section 5
The Supreme Court has read “support” broadly to include informational, logistical, associational, and travel-based conduct aligned with a terrorist group: “Any person knowingly, in any manner, directly or indirectly, solicits or renders support… commits an offence… ‘Support’ … include[s] dissemination of terrorist information by any means inclusive of electronic or internet means… training and identification… provision of information or moral assistance… invitation to adhere to a terrorist or terrorist group, entering and remaining in a country… for the benefit of, or at the direction of or in association with a terrorist group…” —BERENDE v. FRN (2021) LPELR-54993(SC) Per Peter-Odili, JSC (Pp 54–55)
Ingredients of specific hostage-taking/compulsion counts
For Section 15 (hostage-type) counts, the Court of Appeal set out the elements the Prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt:
i) The Defendant committed acts of terrorism.
ii) The Defendant knowingly and willingly committed the acts.
iii) The Defendant seized/detained/attempted to detain the victim, or threatened to kill/injure/continue detention to compel a third party to do or abstain from doing something, or made explicit/implicit conditions for release. — ADAH v. FRN (2024) LPELR-63008(CA) Per Georgewill, JCA (Pp 23–25)
The Court of Appeal has also restated the text of Section 15(1)and its life-imprisonment penalty: — SHEHU v. FRN (2024) LPELR-61662(CA) Per Adegbhehingbe, JCA (Pp 30–31)
Capital-offence implications and pre-trial detention
The Supreme Court treated certain terrorism charges as capital offences, with consequences for the constitutional timing rules on arraignment and trial: Offences “punishable by the death penalty” are capital offences; counts preparatory to/furthering terrorism that lead to mass casualties can fall within that bracket. Section 35(7)(a) of the Constitution displaces the Section 35(4) time-limit protections for persons reasonably suspected of capital offences, and Section 27(1) of the Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013 on remand pending trial is not inconsistent with Section 35(4). — OGWUCHE v. FRN & ORS (2020) LPELR-52523(SC) Per Okoro, JSC (Pp 16–21)
Custody during trial and fair-hearing concerns
On remand in DSS custody (rather than general prison) and the fair-hearing challenge, the Supreme Court affirmed that courts may take judicial notice of governing statutes and that Section 299 ACJA, 2015 supports remand to “other place of safe custody”: Referring to ACJA Section 299 did not breach fair hearing; courts must give effect to statutes whether cited by counsel or not; DSS custody can qualify as “other place of safe custody” for terrorism trials. — OGWUCHE v. FRN & ORS (2020) LPELR-52523(SC) Per Okoro, JSC (Pp 7–13)
Facilitation and attempt: liability without a completed blast
The Court of Appeal emphasized that commission, attempt, participation, or facilitation all attract liability under the controlling provisions: “This law punishes any person who commits or attempts to commit a terrorist act or participates in or facilitates the commission of a terrorist act.” — OKAH v. FRN (2021) LPELR-56655(CA) Per Adah, JCA (Pp 49–51)
Disclaimer
This article is for general information only and does not constitute legal advice. Laws, rules, and judicial interpretations evolve, and case outcomes turn on specific facts. If you need advice on a particular matter, please consult a qualified legal practitioner.
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